Can border carbon taxes fit into the global trade regime?  Bruegel Policy Brief 2013/06, 9 December 2013 by Horn, Henrik & Sapir, André
CAN BORDER CARBON
TAXES FIT INTO THE
GLOBAL TRADE REGIME?
bruegelpolicybrief
ISSUE2013/06
DECEMBER 2013
by Henrik Horn
Non-resident Senior Fellow at Bruegel
henrik.horn@bruegel.org
and André Sapir
Senior Fellow at Bruegel
andre.sapir@bruegel.org
POLICY CHALLENGE
If BCAs are to gain international acceptance, they must be motivated by
clear, economically-sound arguments, but the reasons normally put forward
do not seem to persuade critics. For instance, the European Union still needs
to convince the world about the appropriateness of the extraterritorial fea-
tures of the extension of its emissions trading system to aviation. To gain
international acceptance, an
understanding is needed of the
use and design of border car-
bon measures, perhaps under
the auspices of the World Trade
Organisation. It might also be
preferable to renegotiate tariffs
in the WTO for the most pollut-
ing goods, rather than to allow
countries to impose unilateral
border measures.
Aviation in the ETS: diminishing coverage of emissions
THE ISSUEOne complement to domestic climate policies could be the regu-
lation of carbon dioxide emissions arising during the production of
imported products. Such ‘border carbon adjustments’ (BCAs) are said to
have several benefits, but are also severely criticised. This Policy Brief high-
lights some weaknesses in the standard argumentation for BCAs. But there
is an alternative argument for border carbon measures, based on the fact
that countries expose each other to climate externalities. The reformulated
argument is economically more convincing, and provides a more convinc-
ing justification for the extraterritorial feature of border carbon measures.
However, there are also several important factors mitigating against the
implementation of such measures, including the risk that these measures
will be used for protectionism.
Source: Bruegel based on European Commission. Columns show % of emissions of flights
through European Economic Area airports covered by various European Commission proposals.
* Depending on geographical limit.
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1. SPEECH/11/5, 10
January 2011
(http://europa.eu/rapid/
press-release_SPEECH-
11-5_en.htm). 
2. A Financial Times
editorial with the head-
line ‘One easy way to
start a trade war’ states
that, “if the threat of
[BCAs] emanating from
parts of Europe and the
US are implemented,
the world could enter
into the biggest trade
war since the Great
Depression”(10
December 2009, p10.)
SEVERAL COUNTRIES AND REGIONS
have implemented unilateral cli-
mate regulations, or are
considering the introduction of
such schemes. A highly con-
tentious issue is whether these
climate policies should apply also
to imported products, that is,
whether measures to regulate
emissions from domestic produc-
tion should – or even can legally
– be complemented with ‘border
carbon adjustments’ (BCAs). This
question arises regardless of
whether the climate measure
comes in the form of carbon taxa-
tion, a requirement to purchase
emissions allowances, or direct
regulation of production
processes. The European Union
took a step in the direction of
introducing a BCA through Direc-
tive 2008/101/EC, which
extended the EU emissions trad-
ing system (ETS) to aviation. The
directive was similar to a BCA in
that it required airlines, when tak-
ing off from or landing at an EU
airport, to deliver ETS allowances
based on the emissions during
the whole flight, and hence also
for emissions in non-EU airspace.
And there have been suggestions
that BCAs could be introduced not
just in aviation. For instance, Com-
missioner Algirdas Šemeta said in
2011 that the Commission “will...
continue... to examine the poten-
tial inclusion of imports in the EU
ETS”
1. BCAs have also been dis-
cussed in Australia and in the
United States, where the possibil-
ity of introducing BCAs is
generally viewed as a political
sine qua non condition for the
imposition of carbon caps on
domestic production. 
Several arguments in favour of
BCAs have been advanced. Yet
proposals for BCAs have often met
with fierce resistance. Particularly
contentious is their extraterritorial
feature, which, it is claimed, vio-
lates fundamental principles for
the international allocation of
jurisdiction. The sensitivity of the
issue is vividly illustrated by the
international outcry over the
extension of the ETS to aviation.
The 2008 directive was strongly
criticised by many countries. Sev-
eral, including China, India and the
US, even took measures that could
prevent their  airline operators
from complying with the directive.
As a consequence of the fierce
international opposition, the EU
has delayed its implementation,
and has also recently made its
design less extra-territorial (see
the figure on the front page). Pro-
posals for BCAs have also raised
serious concerns in the trade pol-
icy community, which is alarmed
by the idea of let-
ting countries
unilaterally decide
on the design and
implementation of
what would
inevitably amount
to complex regimes
of trade barriers
2.
In our view, a convincing argu-
ment for a BCA would need to
fulfill at least three requirements.
First, it should be grounded in
basic economic principles and
show how the BCA may be benefi-
cial from an international
perspective. Factoring the inter-
ests of both the importing and
exporting countries into the
analysis is natural in light of the
international tensions that BCAs
are likely to create – if BCAs do
not create global gains, they will
not win international acceptance.
It is also natural to take an inter-
national perspective since much
of the rhetoric in favour of BCAs is
based on the notion that they
improve global welfare.
The second requirement for a con-
vincing argument is that it should
explain how the BCA would be
compatible with fundamental
principles of international alloca-
tion of jurisdiction. This is far from
a foregone conclusion in light of
the fact that the purpose of BCAs
is often to regulate activities that
occur in foreign countries, and
additionally are often undertaken
by foreign nationals. BCAs there-
fore seem antithetical to two
basic jurisdictional rules: the terri-
toriality principle, according to
which a country has the right to
regulate activities that are under-
taken in its territory; and the
nationality principle, which
ensures the coun-
try’s jurisdiction
over its nationals.
These principles
are immensely
important for the
working of the
global economy,
since without such
rules, countries would in principle
be free to regulate any transac-
tion anywhere in the world
(enforcement is a different mat-
ter). The claim that BCAs violate
basic jurisdictional rules is there-
fore a serious matter not only
from a legal perspective, but also
from an economic point of view. 
The first legal challenge against a
BCA-like measure occurred when
the 2008 EU directive on aviation
was challenged before the Euro-
pean Union Court of Justice (ECJ)
by three US airlines, and a US air-
‘The sensitivity of BCAs
is vividly illustrated by
the outcry over the
extension of the ETS to
international aviation.’CAN BORDER CARBON TAXES FIT INTO THE GLOBAL TRADE REGIME?
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3. For a critical discus-
sion of the economic
reasonableness of the
ECJ decision, see Horn,
Henrik (2013) ‘The ECJ
Judgment on the Exten-
sions of the ETS to
Aviation: An Econo-
mist’s Discontent,’
Entwined Report
(www.entwined.se).
4. A good source for ref-
erences to both the
policy debate and the
academic literature is
Tackling Leakage in a
World of Unequal Carbon
Prices, Climate Strate-
gies, 2009, edited by
Susanne Dröge. As an
indication of the magni-
tude of the literature, of
the approximately 150
references therein, most
address BCAs. There are
very few academic stud-
ies of the leverage
argument, but two
recent exceptions are
Böhringer, Christoph,
Jared C. Carbone and
Thomas F. Rutherford
(2011) ‘The Strategic
Value of Embodied Car-
bon Tariffs’, unpublished
manuscript, and Helm,
Dieter, Cameron Hep-
burn and Giovanni Ruta
(2012) ‘Trade, Climate
Change, and the Political
Game Theory of Border
Carbon Adjustments’,
Oxford Review of Eco-
nomic Policy28, 2:
368-394.
5. One such argument
holds that it is desirable
to preserve the compet-
itiveness of the
line association. The ECJ dis-
missed the complaint entirely.
The essence of the ECJ finding
concerning territoriality is the
notion that since the aeroplanes
are in EU territory when they are
at an EU airport, the EU has unlim-
ited jurisdiction. This argument is
not persuasive from an economic
perspective, at least, since it side-
steps entirely the fact that the
purpose of the regulation is to
affect activities not only in the EU,
but also in non-EU territory
3.
Indeed, were it not for the latter,
the directive would have much
smaller impact on emissions.
Hence, from an economic per-
spective, the BCA-like feature of
the directive needs a more con-
vincing justification.
The third requirement for a plausi-
ble argument in favour of a BCA is
that it should show how this
import regulation can be imple-
mented to achieve the suggested
benefits, without risking degener-
ating into protectionist abuse. 
In what follows, we discuss the
arguments normally advanced to
support BCAs. These arguments
are problematic, or at least incom-
plete, from an economic point of
view, and also do not seem to jus-
tify the extraterritorial feature of
BCAs. We then present a simple
reformulation of the standard argu-
ments, based on the existence of
international climate externalities,
which explains why BCAs may as a
matter of principle be desirable
from an international efficiency
point of view, and also be compati-
ble with jurisdictional principles.
We then highlight a number of seri-
ous caveats against the
implementation of BCAs in prac-
tice, before drawing conclusions.
THE MAIN ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR
OF BCAS
BCAs are typically proposed as a
complement to domestic carbon
measures in order to achieve one
of three aims
4. The first is to pre-
serve the competitiveness of
domestic import-competing
industries burdened by the costs
of the domestic policy. A funda-
mental problem with the
competitiveness notion from an
international efficiency point of
view is that one country’s gain in
competitiveness is another coun-
try’s loss. A change in the pattern
of competitiveness therefore
does not create any gains per se
from an international perspective,
and when achieved through trade
restrictions, is outright costly.
Such a policy would smell of pro-
tectionism, and would be hard to
reconcile with fundamental World
Trade Organisation principles, to
which the EU, the US, and most
other countries adhere. Some
additional motive would thus be
required to make a concern with
competitiveness legitimate from
an international efficiency, as
well as a legal, perspective
5.
According to a second line of rea-
soning, BCAs could be used to
prevent ‘carbon leakage’, which is
typically defined as the ratio
between the increase in emis-
sions abroad and the decrease in
domestic emissions caused by
the introduction of the domestic
climate policy. Such leakage
would counteract the reduction in
global carbon emissions gener-
ated by the domestic measures,
and may in principle even cause
emissions to become higher than
in the case of no domestic climate
policy. The leakage argument
hence effectively suggests
employing BCAs to prevent foreign
producers and consumers from
reacting to the change in world
prices caused by the importing
country’s domestic climate policy.
The leakage argument is not fully
satisfactory since it does not
explain why the benefit of a BCA in
terms of a better climate will plau-
sibly dominate the costs of the
measure. Also, the argument
seems to conflict sharply with
basic jurisdictional principles,
since the purpose is to regulate
foreign consumers and produc-
ers. The prevention of leakage is
nevertheless an often cited con-
cern, and it affects the design of,
eg EU rules on state aid, and the
allocation of free carbon
allowances in the ETS.
According to the third argument,
BCAs could be used to leverage
other countries into accepting an
international climate agreement
or introducing their own unilateral
climate policies. This ‘leverage
argument’ is incomplete in the
same sense as the leakage argu-
ment, as long as no further
argument is provided as to why it
is desirable from an international
efficiency point of view to coerce
other governments to adopt poli-
cies they would not otherwise
adopt. We also need an explana-
tion of why such coercion would
not flout jurisdictional principles
6.
To reinforce these points, note
that almost everydomestic policy
reduces the competitiveness of
some domestic industry, and is
often also associated with some
form of policy leakage. For
instance, when a country levies a
general payroll tax to collect taxb
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revenue, the increased production
costs will reduce the competitive-
ness of some import-competing
industries. Furthermore, the
resulting loss of market share for
these industries will reduce the
domestic tax base, ie there is a
‘leakage’. But this would not cre-
ate any presumption that it would
enhance international economic
efficiency if the importing country
were to impose trade barriers to
affect the behaviour of firms and
consumers in exporting coun-
tries, or if other countries were to
be coerced to introduce policies
to prevent these reactions. Nor
would it be compatible with the
WTO Agreement to unilaterally
impose trade barriers to prevent
such ‘leakage’. For an argument in
favour of BCAs to be convincing,
we thus need a justification of
why domestic climate policy dif-
fers from other domestic policies.
The implicit argument: BCAs help
the ‘common good’
Behind the three conventional
arguments there seems to be the
idea that BCAs benefit the ‘com-
mon good’ since they foster the
adoption of climate policies, even
if only unilaterally. For instance, it
is often argued that BCAs are justi-
fied to preserve the
competitiveness of domestic
industry, since the industry
should not have to bear the costs
of a domestic climate policy that is
introduced for the common good.
Or, that BCAs are justified to reduce
leakage or to coerce other govern-
ments to sign on to a climate
agreement since this will reduce
emissions to everyone’s benefit. 
We are not persuaded by such
arguments. Clearly, it cannot be
argued that anything that reduces
the climate problem is justified,
since the logical solution would
then be to completely shut down
all human activities. Even if the
goal is to reduce the climate prob-
lem to everyone’s benefit, there is
still a question about the choice
of means to achieve this. For a
satisfactory argument in favour of
BCAs, it must be shown that its
benefits outweigh the costs from
an international perspective. 
Also, there are strong reasons to
be skeptical when countries claim
to act altruistically. This is particu-
larly obvious with regard to trade
policies, where beggar-thy-neigh-
bour protectionist policies are
endemic, and where there are
numerous examples of countries
using seemingly innocuous regu-
latory regimes for protectionist
purposes. Indeed, the raison
d'être of the WTO is exactly that
countries are not altruistic when
acting unilaterally. In fact, coun-
tries often explicitly state that
their climate policies are partly
motivated by commercial inter-
ests, for instance to get a head
start in future green growth indus-
tries. Rather than altruism, such
arguments suggest the pursuit of
national interests. This could have
important ramifications for
whether a BCA might be viewed as
compatible with jurisdictional
principles and with WTO law.
IS THERE A BETTER FORMULATION
OF THE (POTENTIAL) CASE FOR
BCAS?
As we have argued, the standard
motives for imposing BCAs do not
explain why BCAs are desirable
from an international efficiency
point of view, or why they are
compatible with jurisdictional
principles. We believe, however,
that a simple reformulation of the
case for border carbon measures
can be made in a way that is both
economically sound and that jus-
tifies why such measures might
be compatible with accepted
jurisdictional norms, including
(perhaps) WTO law.
The basic economic dimension of
the climate problem is of course
that when countries combat emis-
sions, they face the full costs of
their own abatement efforts, but
only receive a small fraction of
the benefits that these emissions
reductions create, since the bene-
fits are spread across the globe.
As a result, countries acting uni-
laterally will typically choose
too-lax climate policies from an
international point of view. They
therefore expose each other to
more climate damage than would
be efficient from an international
point of view; that is, there are
international climate externali-
ties
7. Consequently, without an
international climate agreement
that would induce countries to
prevent the externalities, unilat-
eral import restrictions might be
justified from an international effi-
ciency perspective as a
second-best policy to combat the
externalities that stem from the
production of exported goods; we
will return to the important caveat
‘might’ below. Of course, such
import restrictions will also stimu-
late production in domestic
import-competing industries –
there will be a form of ‘reverse car-
bon leakage’. But provided it can
be shown that the net effect is to
reduce emissions – and this will
be more likely the more ambitious
the domestic climate policy –
domestic industry to
prevent a distortion in
the international pro-
duction pattern: if the
importing country only
taxes domestic prod-
ucts, production would
shift towards imported
products. Note that the
alleged benefit of a BCA
here is concerned with
the commercial effects
of BCAs, and not cli-
mate effects. This
argument has a certain
appeal from an eco-
nomic point of view,
although the argument
only focuses on one
relevant aspect. For a
discussion of alloca-
tional effects, see Keen,
Michael and Christos
Kotsogiannis (2012)
‘Coordinating Climate
and Trade Policies:
Pareto Efficiency and
the Role of Border Tax
Adjustments’, IMF Work-
ing Paper12/289.
6. As an example of the
leverage motive, recital
17 of Directive
2008/101/EC hints at
modifying the EU avia-
tion measure for
countries that adopt
regulations that are as
ambitious as those of
the EU.
7. An overview of the lit-
erature on the role of
international climate
agreements for combat-
ting international
environmental external-
ities is provided in Scott
Barrett (2005) ‘The The-
ory of Internationalb
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Environmental Agree-
ments’, in Mäler,
Karl-Göran and Jeffrey R.
Vincent (eds) Handbook
of Environmental Eco-
nomics, Vol. 3 , Elsevier.
8. The effects doctrine
is sometimes seen as a
special case of the terri-
toriality principle.
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ties, since there are clear trans-
boundary adverse effects of
emissions. 
Another reason why the focus on
externalities is not merely a
semantic issue is that it suggests
a rather different role for border
carbon measures than in the con-
ventional arguments. In order for
a border restriction to improve
economic efficiency, the policy
does not need to be an ‘adjust-
ment’, that is, it does not have to
compensate for the lack (or inad-
equacy) of a foreign climate
policy relative to the domestic
policy. Indeed, even if the export-
ing country pursued the same
climate policy as the importing
country, or if the importing coun-
try pursued no policy, there could
still be an externality argument
for a trade restriction, as long as
the exporting country policies do
not fully mitigate climate exter-
nalities. Hence, from an
externality point of view, the legit-
imacy of border carbon measures
does not hinge on the policy
being an ‘adjustment’ that makes
the treatment of imported prod-
ucts symmetric to the treatment
of domestically produced prod-
ucts. The domestic climate policy
will still be important from an effi-
ciency point of view, however,
since the more ambitious this pol-
icy is, the more likely is it that
there will only be small ‘reverse
carbon leakage’ from the increase
in domestic production that the
border measure induces. An
ambitious domestic climate pol-
icy may also be important for the
sake of WTO legality and political
acceptability of BCAs. 
Yet another reason why the inter-
national externalities motivation
is not just a semantic reformula-
tion of the traditional arguments
is that it seems to allow for a
much broader scope for using
border carbon measures: even
the countries with the most ambi-
tious climate policies are likely to
expose the rest of the world to cli-
mate externalities. Consequently,
almost any country would be a
potential target for border carbon
measures. 
Finally, without purporting to
undertake a legal analysis, it
seems clear that it would be
incompatible with WTO law to
impose a duty on imported prod-
ucts solely to preserve the
competitiveness of a domestic
industry that is being burdened
with the cost of some domestic
policy. Nor could a duty be
imposed simply in order to pre-
vent foreign consumers and
producers from adjusting to the
changes in international prices
that stem from the imposition of
some domestic policy in the
importing country, or in order to
induce exporting countries to
change their domestic policies to
the benefit of the importing coun-
try. Central to the possibility that
WTO judges will accept border car-
bon measures is instead that they
serve to reduce international cli-
mate externalities.
CAVEATS
As already argued, basic eco-
nomic principles suggest a
potential justification for why bor-
der carbon measures may be
desirable from an economic effi-
ciency viewpoint. But the
argument rests on a number of
strong implicit assumptions that
may not be fulfilled in practice:
there can be an argument for
imposing trade barriers as a
defense against foreign emis-
sions. Straightforward as this
argument is from an economic
point of view, it is not how BCAs
normally are argued in the policy
debate, as we saw above. 
This reformulation of the BCA
question is not just a matter of
semantics. One reason is that the
externality argument points to a
fundamental economic reason
why BCAs may enhance interna-
tional efficiency. It thus has a
more  straightforward basis in
conventional economic principles
than arguments concerning, eg
competitiveness. Another reason
is that the argument does not rely
on unpersuasive claims concern-
ing altruism. 
The externality argument also
suggests a reason why the extra-
territoriality of border carbon
measures may be compatible
with standard jurisdictional princi-
ples. Indeed, according to the
‘effects doctrine’ countries have
jurisdiction over transactions that
they are affected by
8. This juris-
dictional principle is relied upon,
for example, by the EU and the US
in their extraterritorial applica-
tions of competition policy/
anti-trust. For instance, a price
cartel that is formed in a foreign
territory would typically still be
illegal in both the EU and the US,
and their competition authorities
would seek to block mergers tak-
ing place in other countries if
there are sufficiently strong
adverse effects for their respec-
tive markets. It appears
straightforward to apply the
effects doctrine in the case of
international climate externali-Climate externalities may
already be internalised through
the WTO Agreement
A basic objection against the
externalities argument is that it is
oblivious to the fact that there is
already an international agree-
ment on trade barriers — the WTO.
There is a rather strong presump-
tion, also based on economic
principles, that when an agree-
ment is negotiated, the parties do
not leave anything obvious ‘on
the table’. This suggests that the
parties have not left unexploited
any global welfare gains that
could be had from unilateral tariff
increases. Oddly, the economic
literature on BCAs almost uni-
formly ignores the existence of
trade agreements such as the
WTO.  
There are, however, several plau-
sible reasons why the tariffs that
have been agreed and bound in
the WTO do not fully reflect cli-
mate externalities. An important
reason is obviously that the cli-
mate problem was not
appreciated in policy circles in the
late 1980s and early 1990s when
current tariff schedules were
negotiated. The current tariff lev-
els are therefore unlikely to
reflect climate effects. Also, trade
negotiations are unlikely to take
full account of environmental
aspects due to the compartmen-
talisation of most government
bureaucracies into different pol-
icy areas. Furthermore, the goods
classification system that is used
for negotiating and binding tariffs
does not distinguish between
products according to the emis-
sions that are released in their
production, and moreover tariff
negotiations typically use
b
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9. One of the few stud-
ies of the risk for
protectionist use of
BCAs is Holmes, Peter,
Jim Rollo and Tom
Reilly (2009) Border
Carbon Adjustments:
The Protectionist Risk,
CARIS, University of
Sussex.
10. Also, if these
schemes do not keep
track of emissions dur-
ing the whole
production chain, there
will be strong incentives
for exporting firms to
avoid the border carbon
measure by letting the
polluting part of the pro-
duction process be
undertaken by inde-
pendent firms. Border
carbon measures will
thus require something
akin to rules-of-origin
regimes. Alternatively, if
importing countries
instead keeping track of
actual emissions in the
production chain use
more-or-less arbitrary
benchmarks for the car-
bon content of imported
products, as is some-
times suggested, these
benchmarks may be
manipulated for protec-
tionist purposes.
11. The list is partly
inspired by the ambi-
tious work by Cosbey,
Aaron (2012) ‘It Ain’t
Easy: The Complexities
of Creating a Regime for
Border Carbon Adjust-
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broadly applicable formulas for
tariff cuts, thus making it hard to
target goods with large emissions. 
It thus seems plausible that cur-
rent tariff levels do not
appropriately reflect climate
effects. But it does not follow that
it would be desirable to increase
the tariff on any imported carbon-
intensive good, since each tariff
increase would lead to ‘reverse
carbon leakage’, and it is an open
question whether the net effect
will be to reduce total emissions.
BCAs could turn into
protectionism
There are strong reasons to
believe that even if introduced
with the best of intentions, border
carbon measures will be misused
for protectionist reasons, just like
other trade-affecting policy
instruments
9. This seems a well-
founded fear in particular in light
of the close parallel in terms of
regulatory aspects between bor-
der carbon measures and two
provisions of the GATT/WTO that
have turned into protectionist
instruments. 
The first provision is the
antidumping regime, which
allows governments to unilater-
ally impose duties on imported
products when they are priced
below ‘normal value’ by exporting
firms. Although dumping may be
‘unfair’ and antidumping duties
may be appropriate in some
instances, most economists con-
sider that actual antidumping
regimes have degenerated into
protectionist instruments. An
important reason is that such
regimes give countries significant
discretion in evaluating whether
the conditions for the imposition
of antidumping duties are fulfilled
and in calculating the magnitude
of such duties. The second provi-
sion is the rules-of-origin system
that accompanies preferential tar-
iff agreements, which is meant to
prevent exporters from non-pref-
erential origins taking advantage
of trade concessions granted to
exporters from preferential coun-
tries. These rules have become
extremely complex, and are occa-
sionally administratively so
onerous to comply with that pref-
erence-eligible exporting firms
deliberately choose to ship their
products under less-advanta-
geous, but administratively
simpler, tariff regimes. 
These two examples should
sound an alarm regarding the
potential misuse of border carbon
measures. It is highly likely that
BCA regimes will be at least as
complicated as antidumping and
rules-of-origin regimes and there-
fore that they might be designed
or implemented in protectionist
fashion as is often the case of
dumping and rules-of-origin sys-
tems
10. Box 1 on the next page
provides a glimpse into the poten-
tial complexity of BCAs by
pointing to some of the aspects
that would need to be
addressed
11. The highly incom-
plete list in Box 1 already shows
the significant freedom that
importing countries would have in
designing and implementing
BCAs. 
A small caveat, though: even if
BCAs were applied in protectionist
fashion in the relatively few emis-
sions-intensive industries that
are normally mentioned as tar-
gets for BCAs (petrochemicals,glass, ceramics, aluminum, steel,
pulp and paper, etc), this may
cause limited distortions. Protec-
tionism would of course increase
prices and thus reduce aggregate
consumption and production in
these industries, but this could be
b
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ment’, ENTWINED Issue
Brief14; and Cosbey,
Aaron et al(2012) ‘A
Guide for the Concerned:
Guidance on the Elabora-
tion and Implementation
of Border Carbon Adjust-
ment’, ENTWINED Policy
Report03
(www.entwined.se).
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desirable as long as there are
remaining externalities.
But protectionism might become
considerably more costly if BCAs
were introduced more broadly
than in a few carbon-intensive
sectors. If protectionism creeps
into the application of the BCAs in
large swathes of import-compet-
ing industries, and thus in
industries with only modest emis-
sions, this could become
seriously damaging. It is therefore
very important that BCAs be
designed to reduce this risk as
much as possible. The ‘adjust-
ment’ aspect of a BCA – the notion
that the burden on imported prod-
ucts should not exceed that on
domestic products – could be
seen as a means to prevent pro-
tectionism, similar to how the
WTO’s national treatment provi-
sion is meant to work.
BCAs may be perceived as unfair
In our view, for a border carbon
measure to be warranted, it does
not suffice to show that it can be
justified on economic efficiency
and jurisdictional grounds, and
that the caveats raised above are
addressed. It is equally important
that the measure be perceived as
fair in terms of the international
distribution of costs and benefits
that it entails. This will in turn
largely depend on the reasonwhy
targeted exporting countries
maintain lower environmental
standards than the importing
country. For instance, is this
because exporting countries  are
much poorer, because they have
not contributed to the problem to
the same extent as the importing
country in the past, or because
they are trying to free ride? The
likelihood that border carbon
measures will be considered
unfair by target countries is
enhanced by the fact that the
countries that contemplate intro-
ducing border carbon measures
were often the main culprits for
BOX 1: DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS FOR BCAs
￿ What is the exact purpose of the BCA, for instance, is it to affect con-
sumers and producers in exporting countries, or climate policies?
￿ How should any revenue it raises be used, should it be retained by
the importing country, or transferred to the exporting country? 
￿ Which products should be included in the scheme?
￿ How far back into the production chain should emissions be calculated?
￿ Should actual emissions and/or benchmarks for emissions be
used?
￿ If benchmarks, based on emissions data from exporting country or
importing country, from best or worst practice?
￿ How to treat emissions from transportation? If to be included, could
carbon taxes on eg fuel inputs be deducted? 
￿ How to adjust if the exporting country is much poorer, and if they are
also heavy polluters?
￿ How to adjust when the importing country has more historic guilt for
the climate problem?
￿ If exemptions are made on the basis of eg exporting country income
or lack of historical contribution to the problem, how to ensure that
imported products have sufficient origin in the exporting country?
￿ How to adjust if an exporting country also has a cap-and-trade sys-
tem, perhaps one that is less stringent? 
￿ How to adjust if importing country has cap-and-trade system, and
exporting country has some other form regulation, carbon taxation
say? 
￿ How to adjust if exporting country has ambitious climate policy for
its exports, but not for production for domestic consumption?
￿ How to adjust if exporting country pursues other climate friendly
policies, say carbon capture and sequestration?
￿ How to adjust if exporting country’s emissions are allowed under an
international climate agreement to which the importing is, or is not,
a party?
￿ What data should exporters submit?
￿ What kind of verification process will be required for emissions data?
￿ What procedures will exist for exporting firms to appeal assessed
emissions?
￿ How to treat exporters that do not deliver information concerning
direct or indirect emissions?
￿ How to ensure exporting firms have access to allowances at the
same administrative costs as domestic firms? 
￿ Can exporters eg purchase international carbon offsets, rather than
allowances issued by the importing country?b
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the historic build-up of green-
house gases in the atmosphere,
and are also typically richer than
the likely targets of their contem-
plated border carbon measures.
CONCLUSION
To gain international acceptance,
the rationale for border carbon
measures must be spelled out
clearly and persuasively. In our
view, the policy debate has
largely failed to do so with its
focus on competitiveness, leak-
age and leverage. But an
economically sound argument for
border carbon measures can be
advanced, which sees such
measures as a second-best
response to international climate
externalities, in the absence of an
international climate agreement.
The focus on externalities also
provides a motivation as to why
BCAs respect established jurisdic-
tional principles despite their
extraterritorial features.
Nonetheless, a number of caveats
need to be addressed before
actual implementation of border
carbon measures can be recom-
mended. First, because existing
tariffs have been set through
extensive multilateral negotia-
tions, there must be a
presumption that tariffs are rea-
sonably efficient from an
international viewpoint, leaving
little room for unilateral measures
to improve on such outcomes. An
efficiency-based argument for a
border carbon measure must
therefore explain why existing tar-
the WTO could be an appropriate
forum to cobble it together. 
Another partial resolution would
be to use the WTO to address the
climate problem more directly.
The climate efforts in the WTO
have so far focused on reducing
trade barriers for ‘green’ products.
As a complement, one might also
renegotiate tariffs for the most
polluting products. As argued
above, there are reasons to
believe that these tariffs are too
low when taking the climate
impacts of these products into
account. This approach would
thus use an existing, and reason-
ably well-functioning, multilateral
framework to address the multi-
lateral climate problem. It would
also avoid some of the problems
with BCAs discussed above – the
jurisdictional issues, the possibil-
ity of protectionist abuse, etc. But
it would of course not be the most
efficient means of addressing the
climate problem, since it could
only affect international externali-
ties from the production of traded
products. A comprehensive global
climate agreement would be far
better.
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iffs are systematically and signifi-
cantly inefficient. Second, one
must also address the possibility
that although introduced in princi-
ple for the purpose of
environmental protection, border
carbon measures risk becoming
in fact protectionist instruments.
Third, arguments in favour of
implementing border carbon
measures need to explain why
and how they would be fair from
an international perspective. 
The case for border carbon meas-
ures thus sits between a rock and
a hard place: the importance and
urgency of the climate problem
speaks in favour of swift action to
limit emissions, but border carbon
measures are likely to suffer from
major drawbacks that could be
extremely damaging to the world
economy. Purely unilateral meas-
ures are also likely to draw such
intense international opposition
that many countries contemplat-
ing border carbon measures are
likely to refrain from implement-
ing them. The recent experience
of the EU’s attempt to extend its
ETS to international aviation, illus-
trates the point.  
As a partial resolution of this
dilemma it would be desirable to
achieve some form of multilateral
agreement on how border carbon
measures could be implemented,
similarly (though hopefully more
strictly) to how the WTO Agreement
puts some discipline on the use of
antidumping duties
12. In light of
the fact that any such agreement
would have to be WTO compatible,
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